Argentina's recurrent fiscal dominance can be understood as a self-reinforcing institutional configuration rather than a succession of isolated policy errors. A political-economy framework links four mechanisms: common-pool expenditure bargaining, soft subnational budget constraints, the political choice between explicit taxation and inflationary finance, and credibility-dependent sovereign borrowing costs. Their interaction is central: weak fiscal cost internalization raises spending demands; politically costly taxation encourages the deferral or monetization of financing needs; credibility erosion then raises borrowing costs and can reduce the revenue obtainable from seigniorage. A compact analytical model derives expenditure and financing conditions and characterizes the credibility feedback, while distinguishing the Nash equilibrium of fiscal bargaining from the stationary configuration of the wider system. Descriptive evidence from Argentina's hyperinflation, convertibility and post-convertibility experiences, including federal and provincial fiscal balances, inflation outcomes and monetary financing, is used to assess the historical plausibility of these mechanisms. The fiscal adjustment initiated in 2024 and continued in 2025 is considered as a potentially relevant departure from earlier patterns, whose durability remains an open question. The evidence establishes historical consistency, not causal identification or an estimated structural model. Durable stabilization is therefore hypothesized to depend on institutional reforms that alter fiscal cost internalization, intergovernmental incentives and monetary-fiscal credibility, rather than on short-lived changes in policy instruments alone.